How Are Leaders Talking About This?

The Rhetorical Landscape

When local leaders describe overdose response teams to their communities, a consistent pattern emerges: they frame the program as a practical extension of emergency services, not a social services experiment. The language emphasizes that the team comes back after the overdose, that it pairs medical professionals with people who have personally survived addiction, and that the cycle of repeat emergency calls is expensive, exhausting, and preventable.

Milwaukee Fire Captain Dave Polachowski captured the operational frame that appears across jurisdictions: “Our badge gets us in the door, and then the peer support takes over.”¹ Austin Mayor Kirk Watson articulated the systemic shift: “We are no longer in Austin and Travis County reacting to a crisis. We are building a system that prevents it.”²

The rhetoric works because the model sits in a political space that few alternative response programs occupy. It does not replace police. It does not compete with law enforcement for calls. It extends EMS rather than creating a parallel system. And the crisis it addresses crosses every demographic, geographic, and political line in the country.

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Three Themes That Appear Across Successful Programs

We Don’t Abandon People After Their Worst Night

The most common narrative frame centers on what happens after the overdose is reversed. Leaders describe a system that currently revives people and walks away, then contrast it with a model that comes back the next day and keeps coming back.

The language leaders use: “When our paramedics revive someone from an overdose, we’re not going to just pack up and leave. We’re sending teams back the next day, and the day after, until that person gets the help they need to survive.”

This works because it shows leadership taking personal responsibility for a gap in the system. It is specific (teams come back the next day) rather than abstract (we’re offering services). It puts the listener in the position of the person who was abandoned after their worst night, which creates an emotional logic that is difficult to argue against regardless of political orientation.

Republican Mayor Erin Stewart of New Britain, Connecticut demonstrated the bipartisan reach of this frame: “We set a goal in 2022 of reducing the death rate by 30%. To reduce it by 50% in two years is remarkable.”³ Her language focused on measurable results, not values signaling.

Breaking the Expensive Cycle

The second theme reframes the program as fiscal discipline rather than compassion. Leaders describe the status quo as wasteful: the same address, the same overdose, the same ambulance, the same ER visit, the same discharge, the same call next week. Overdose response teams break the cycle by addressing the underlying pattern rather than responding to the same emergency repeatedly.

The language leaders use: “Our first responders are exhausted responding to the same addresses week after week. Same overdose, same revival, same discharge, same call next week. Overdose response teams break that cycle. One follow-up visit costs far less than five emergency responses.”

This works because it acknowledges the resource strain on first responders (which conservative audiences care about) and presents the program as a cost-saving measure (which fiscal hawks respond to) without leading with compassion language (which some audiences interpret as permissiveness).

Portland Deputy Fire Chief Stephanie Sullivan provided the sharpest fiscal data point in a November 2024 interview: “About 68% of the people who we responded to who had opioid overdoses, we were able to treat them in the field and not send them to the emergency department. We’ve saved $9 million in the health care system.”⁴ When a fire chief talks about saving $9 million, the conversation shifts from “should we care about these people” to “can we afford not to do this.”

Right Help at the Right Time

The third theme describes the model’s staffing logic: paramedics handle the medical emergency, peer specialists who have personally survived addiction build trust and connection. Leaders emphasize that the team is sending trained professionals matched to the specific problem, not defaulting to a one-size-fits-all emergency response.

The language leaders use: “We’re sending paramedics to handle the medical emergency and peer specialists who’ve been through recovery to build trust. Not police to make arrests. Not lectures. Just the right professionals with the right training for this specific crisis.”

This works because it is pro-expertise without being anti-police. It describes smart resource deployment in language that sounds like good management rather than ideology. And it introduces the peer specialist role in a way that frames lived experience as a professional qualification, not a personal backstory.

Ryan Gorman, a recovery counselor and former drug user with Milwaukee’s Overdose Response Initiative (MORI), described the mechanism: peer specialists connect “in ways others cannot because they’ve been there.”⁵ Connie Priddy of Huntington’s QRT described what even incomplete contacts accomplish: “Even if they’re not ready for treatment, they appreciate someone checking in, asking how they are, bringing them resources. To have people looking, and looking out, for you and saying, we care and are here for you, is powerful.”⁶

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Language That Resonates vs. Language That Tests Poorly

Across the jurisdictions with operating programs, consistent patterns emerge in which language builds support and which language triggers resistance.

Language That Tests Poorly	Language Leaders Use Instead	Why the Shift Matters
“Overdose response initiative”	“Overdose response teams”	Teams are concrete. Initiatives are bureaucratic.
“We’re offering services”	“We’re sending paramedics and peer specialists”	Specific professionals, not vague services.
“Vulnerable populations” or “People struggling with addiction”	“People who overdosed” or “Our neighbors”	Direct and human. Not categories.
“Compassionate response”	“Medical response that saves lives”	Practical, not emotional. Focus on results.
“Wrap-around services”	“Follow-up visits until they’re ready for treatment”	Concrete action, not jargon.
“Harm reduction”	“Preventing the next overdose”	Clear outcome everyone understands.

The pattern is consistent: language that sounds like a social worker’s case notes tests poorly. Language that sounds like a fire chief describing a deployment tests well. The most effective leaders describe overdose response teams as an operational improvement to emergency services, not as a social program.

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Common Objections and How Officials Respond

The opposition arguments that overdose response teams face are predictable and well-documented. Leaders who have successfully responded to them share common patterns.

Objection: “This is coddling people who keep making bad choices.”

How officials typically respond: “Combat veterans. High school seniors. Young mothers. The opioid crisis doesn’t care who you are. When we can save a life by following up after an overdose, we’re going to do it.”

Why this response works: It names real people rather than engaging with the “bad choices” frame. It makes the conversation about who is actually overdosing rather than about an abstraction. Polachowski used a version of this approach by listing the demographics his team encounters: “teenagers to an 83-year-old.”

Objection: “Why are we spending money on people who don’t want help?”

How officials typically respond: “Most people don’t say yes to treatment the night they overdose. That’s reality. Our teams go back when they’re ready. Day two, day five, day ten. That’s when lives get saved.”

Why this response works: It acknowledges the reality of addiction without apology. It reframes “don’t want help” as “not ready yet” and presents persistence as the solution rather than giving up. Molinski described the operational version: “There’s no limit on the amount of times we’ll go back if they want us to come back.”

Objection: “We should focus on arresting dealers, not chasing users.”

How officials typically respond: “We absolutely need to hold dealers accountable. We also need to save the lives of people who are overdosing today. We can walk and chew gum at the same time.”

Why this response works: It refuses to accept the false binary. It affirms law enforcement’s role in supply-side enforcement while defending the demand-side intervention. Austin Police Association President Michael Bullock modeled a version of this by testifying that law enforcement needs to stop responding to overdoses, not because police are unimportant but because officers were never the appropriate responders for medical emergencies.

Objection: “These people are choosing drugs over their families.”

How officials typically respond: “I’ve met too many parents who lost kids to overdoses to believe anyone chooses this. Addiction is a medical crisis. We treat heart attacks, we treat overdoses. That’s how we save lives.”

Why this response works: It uses personal testimony from the official to counter the “choice” frame. It reframes addiction as medical rather than moral without being preachy about it. Huntington’s clergy team members provided a version from a different angle: they reported that visits help families “feel less helpless after burying so many people.”

Objection: “You’re wasting money on repeat offenders who will never change.”

How officials typically respond: “Every repeat call costs thousands. Ambulance, ER, police time. One successful connection to treatment costs far less than a year of emergency responses. This saves money and lives.”

Why this response works: It converts the “waste” frame from the objection to the status quo. The waste is not in the program; the waste is in not having the program. Sullivan’s $9 million savings figure makes this argument concrete rather than theoretical.

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How Supporters and Skeptics Frame the Issue

The framing landscape for overdose response teams can be mapped in four quadrants.

Supporters on Their Position: “We’re building overdose response teams that do what nobody else is doing. They come back. After our paramedics save someone’s life, our peer specialists follow up the next day, and keep coming back until that person is ready for treatment. This breaks the cycle of repeat overdoses, reduces pressure on first responders, and saves lives.”

Supporters on the Opposition: “They want to keep doing the same thing: revive people and abandon them. Then act surprised when it’s the same overdose at the same address next week. That’s not a response. That’s just waiting for someone to die. We need teams that follow up, not give up.”

Skeptics Channeling Supporters: “You’re wasting taxpayer money chasing after drug addicts who don’t want help. These people made their choices. Stop coddling criminals and start supporting law enforcement to go after their dealers.”

Skeptics on Their Position: “Tough love and accountability is how we stop people dying from drug overdoses. People need forced treatment or jail time. Their dealers need prosecuted and put in jail. Stop enabling addiction with soft policies.”

The political landscape reveals an asymmetry: supporters frame the issue in operational and fiscal terms (teams, follow-up, cost savings, preventing repeat calls), while skeptics frame it in moral terms (choices, accountability, coddling, enabling). The supporters’ frame has proven more durable in legislative settings because it speaks to measurable outcomes rather than values judgments. Skeptics’ strongest argument is the moral hazard claim, which supporters counter most effectively with named demographics (veterans, teenagers, mothers) rather than with values arguments.

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Adapting the Message by Community Type

The core argument is the same everywhere. The entry point shifts by context.

In urban settings, leaders lead with the visibility of the crisis: overdoses on sidewalks, in parks, near transit hubs. The frame emphasizes shifting overdose response from law enforcement to medical care and relieving pressure on first responders, emergency rooms, and public spaces.

In suburban communities, leaders lead with the disruption to daily life: overdoses at parks, shopping centers, and commuter stations. The frame emphasizes preventing repeated 911 calls, helping EMS and police focus on other emergencies, and addressing addiction with treatment rather than incarceration.

In small towns and rural areas, leaders lead with resource scarcity: “When resources are limited, we can’t afford to waste a response.” The frame emphasizes getting trained professionals to treat the overdose and connect people to care the first time, avoiding repeated calls that consume the community’s single ambulance unit.

In college towns, leaders lead with protecting young people: “When a student overdoses, the response needs to be medical, not criminal.” The frame emphasizes appropriate care, avoiding criminal records for health emergencies, and keeping campus communities safe.

In conservative-leaning areas, the most effective frame describes the program as “a smarter, more disciplined response that gets results.” The heroes are “local medics, veterans, and recovery experts helping people get clean and get back on track.” The language emphasizes fiscal discipline, stopping repeat calls, and freeing up police and EMS for other emergencies.

In progressive-leaning areas, the most effective frame describes the program as “a health-first model that treats addiction like the medical issue it is.” The heroes are “trained responders rooted in public health, not punishment.” The language emphasizes evidence-based care and ending the jail-to-ER cycle.

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Quick Hits by Audience

For law enforcement audiences: “Our badge gets us in the door, and then the peer support takes over.” Captain Dave Polachowski, Milwaukee.

For fiscal conservatives: “About 68% of the people who we responded to who had opioid overdoses, we were able to treat them in the field and not send them to the emergency department. We’ve saved $9 million in the health care system.” Deputy Fire Chief Stephanie Sullivan, Portland.

For healthcare leaders: “We are the one that will connect them to treatment, but we’re also just there to check on them to make sure they’re OK… and I think that’s mattered.” Connie Priddy, Huntington QRT Program Coordinator.

For elected officials: “This program should be developed as a model, not just for the state of West Virginia, but for the entire country.” Dr. Rahul Gupta, White House Office of National Drug Control Policy Director.⁷

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Proof Points Leaders Cite

When officials make the case for overdose response teams, they draw on a consistent library of data points. The evidence tier varies, and leaders should understand which numbers carry independent verification and which are program-reported.

Colerain Township reported a 42% drop in overdose calls between 2017 and 2019 and an 80% treatment connection rate. New Britain reported a 51% decline in opioid-related deaths between 2023 and 2024. Austin reported a 22% drop in overall opioid deaths and a 36% decrease in fentanyl-related deaths in 2024 compared to 2023. Sacramento reported a 32% reduction in fentanyl-related deaths in full-year 2024 compared to 2023 (an earlier partial-year estimate of 56% was revised downward with complete data). Portland’s CHAT reported 68% field treatment without ER transport as of November 2024 and estimated healthcare savings exceeding $11 million since 2021. Burlington reported its first sustained decrease in monthly overdoses since before the pandemic after launching its program. Nationally, 80% of voters support creating Quick Response Teams (a Safer Cities/Data for Progress national poll of 1,249 voters measuring sentiment, not program effectiveness). Important context: CDC final data showed national overdose deaths declined 26.2% in 2024, the largest annual decline ever recorded, meaning jurisdiction-level declines should be read against this broader trend.⁸

These numbers are effective in public settings but carry important caveats covered in the evidence section of this resource. Community-level overdose reductions reflect the impact of broader systems, not isolated program effects. Treatment connection rates use different definitions across programs. The polling number measures public support, not whether the program works. Leaders who understand these distinctions are better prepared when a reporter or council member presses on the data.

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The Bottom Line: Leaders who successfully advocate for overdose response teams frame the program as a practical extension of emergency services, not a social experiment. They lead with what happens after the overdose (the team comes back), describe the cost of doing nothing (repeat calls, ER visits, deaths), and counter the moral hazard objection with named demographics (veterans, teenagers, mothers). The most effective language sounds like a fire chief describing a deployment, not a social worker describing services. The political landscape favors programs that frame their work in operational and fiscal terms, and the model’s design avoids the ideological fault lines that complicate other alternative response programs.