How Are Leaders Talking About This?

Section 12: How Are Leaders Talking About This?

Curated from program launches, press coverage, legislative testimony, and original polling

Overview

Mobile crisis response teams have responded successfully to hundreds of thousands of calls across the country — the vast majority of them resolved without needing law enforcement. That means officers spent more time on serious crime, and people in crisis got the care they actually needed.

Across cities of every size, the leaders who have launched and expanded these programs describe the logic the same way: send the right first responder to solve the right problem.

When it's a robbery in progress, or a shooting, then obviously we need to send an armed sheriff's deputy. But if we are talking about a person sleeping on a sidewalk, or a teenager who is suicidal and swallowed pills, then we need a behavioral health expert to respond… We are sending the right experts to solve the right problems.

Harris County Commissioner Rodney Ellis12

For years, 911 had only one play in a mental health crisis: send law enforcement to every call — even when the issue was solely mental health-related, not a crime. That often meant officers were put in impossible situations they weren't trained to handle, instead of focusing on more serious threats to public safety. Meanwhile, the person who needed medical care didn't get it — making it more likely officers would be back at the same scene later.

Mobile crisis teams reflect a different philosophy. When a person is struggling with a mental health crisis, send a mental health response. You don't send a police officer to treat a heart attack just like you don't send a police officer to treat a panic attack. Communities are safer when we match the response to the crisis.

If I'm having a heart attack, 911 isn't going to send the police. Why do we do that when someone is having a behavioral health crisis?

Harris County Judge Lina Hidalgo13

Mobile crisis response works — now it needs to work for everyone, all across the country, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

Three Themes That Appear Across Successful Programs

The leaders who champion mobile crisis response consistently organize their public communications around three themes.

1. Public Safety and Role Clarity

The most common frame emphasizes that the job is simple: send the right responder to the right call. That's how communities stay safe. Leaders across the political spectrum describe mobile crisis response teams as freeing up police officers to focus on the important work they're trained to do — stop and solve shootings and violent crime. As multiple officials put it: safety isn't one-size-fits-all. A home invasion needs an armed police officer. A person struggling with mental illness needs a clinician — not sirens, not a badge, not a gun.

This innovative new department is already helping to free up our officers so they can respond to high-priority calls. This third branch of public safety bridges a gap, and provides residents with the response they deserve.

Former Albuquerque Police Chief Harold Medina4

The frame is pro-police on its face. The language positions mobile crisis response as something that helps officers, not something that replaces them. Sacramento County Sheriff Jim Cooper3 used the most direct version:

Being mentally ill is not a crime and we can't be the answer. Law enforcement officers are not trained mental health professionals. We're not psychiatrists and psychologists. We don't deal with it. We've had minimal training at de-escalation… We wear the badge, we carry the gun, we deal with crime, not mental health crises.

Sacramento County Sheriff Jim Cooper

When a sheriff says it this bluntly, it neutralizes the "anti-police" attack entirely. The messenger changes the political calculus in ways that advocacy organizations and polling data cannot — a law enforcement voice endorsing civilian crisis response preempts the most common opposition frame before it can take hold.

2. Care That Prevents the Next Crisis

Leaders consistently emphasize that when someone is having a mental health crisis, they need a mental health professional — someone trained to listen, de-escalate, and connect them to ongoing treatment. The frame that resonates is that sending a mobile crisis team with the right tools and experience stops the same crisis from happening next week, reduces repeat 911 calls, and keeps neighborhoods safer. Officials describe mobile crisis teams not as just resolving the immediate crisis, but as connecting people to the care that prevents the next one — breaking the cycle of repeated 911 calls.

By addressing the underlying mental health and substance use needs that led to the 911 call in the first place, HART can resolve the immediate situation, get the person the help they need to stabilize their life, and make it much less likely the person requires an emergency response in the future.

Harris County Commissioner Rodney Ellis12

The power of this frame is that it redefines what "effective" means. It shifts the conversation from "did someone show up" to "did the cycle stop." That's a much stronger position for advocates and a much harder one for skeptics to argue with.

3. Efficiency and Resource Alignment

Fiscal and operational leaders frame mobile crisis response as protecting the most vital work law enforcement does — by taking the calls that were never police work to begin with. The analogy used most often: you wouldn't send a police officer to treat a heart attack; you shouldn't send one to treat a panic attack either. The underlying message is that mental health professionals know how to de-escalate a mental health crisis because that's what they're trained to do.

It's time that we work towards getting law enforcement out of mental health. We have never claimed to be the experts, but yet we have been charged with the responsibility.

Austin Police Association President Michael Bullock2, testimony before Austin City Council

When a police union president uses this language before a city council, it demonstrates the frame's political range. This isn't reform rhetoric — it's operational common sense delivered by the people most affected.

Language That Resonates, and Why

Across polling, public testimony, and press coverage, certain frames consistently generate broad support while others create unnecessary political friction.

Here's what these themes sound like in practice:

It's really about meeting the needs of the community and making sure we are sending the right experts, so we can actually solve the problem.

Carleigh Sailon, former STAR Program Manager, Denver14

[Our crisis teams] are responding to the mental health crisis with solutions that are long-term and sustainable… [while] at the same time, freeing up our officers to fight crime.

Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass15

We realized our community was experiencing increased mental health and substance use crises… and we didn't believe people were getting the care they needed.

Baton Rouge Police Chief Murphy Paul16

Polling confirms why these frames work. The "right responder" frame tested as the second most persuasive argument in a national survey of 2,503 registered voters:

+64% Net effective (82% to 18%), "Community safety departments are about sending the right responder to address every problem. When the call is for a robbery in progress, we should send the police. When the call is for a mental health crisis, we should send trained mental health professionals."

The single most persuasive argument went further — it explained why the current approach fails:

+72% Net effective (86% to 14%), "Police officers often show up with sirens blaring, bright lights, and firearms. They also are trained to use their authority to control a situation. These work in a home invasion, for example, but can backfire when dealing with people in acute mental crises because they further escalate the situation."

And in a randomized controlled trial testing different message frames, "police… can't do it alone" was the best-performing message across every sub-group — a frame that centers law enforcement and positions mobile crisis as support, not replacement. "Fully fund public safety"1 and "treatment, not trauma" also tested well, while sloganeering and anti-police language consistently underperformed.

Common Objections and How Officials Respond

A predictable set of objections arises in every city. Here is how officials who have successfully addressed them respond.

The "isn't proven" and "not safe" objections collapse when you cite the numbers:

80% of voters — including 89% of Democrats and 72% of Republicans5 — say mobile crisis response units are "effective" at making their community safer. (National survey of 2,503 registered voters, 2024. Consistent with a 2025 NAMI6/Ipsos national poll finding that 85% of Americans believe crisis situations should receive a mental health response, not a police response.)

58% of voters prefer spending additional public safety dollars on mobile crisis units, versus just 34% who prefer hiring more police officers — when forced to choose.

Officials who have faced the "resources" objection have countered with voices from inside law enforcement:

This should have been done a long time ago… police are very needed, it's just these types of calls weren't meant for us.

Philadelphia Police Officer Kenneth Harper17

Officials who face the "we can't afford it" objection have flipped the fiscal frame:

Expecting law enforcement to answer every call on every issue from homelessness to mental health and addiction is too much to ask.

Columbus City Council President Shannon Hardin18

Hardin's language is pro-police (it's unfair to ask this of officers) and practical (these calls need different expertise). A Michigan state survey of law enforcement professionals found that "the vast majority of local police chiefs support having some type of specialized emergency response" for some 911 calls.11

Language That Tests Well vs. Language That Tests Poorly

Leaders who have successfully built coalitions avoid language that triggers partisan frames or alienates potential allies.

How Supporters and Skeptics Frame the Issue

Understanding how each side frames its position reveals the pressure points in any local debate.

Supporters, On Their Position Mobile crisis response teams have handled hundreds of thousands of calls — most resolved without needing law enforcement. That means officers spent more time on serious crime, and people in crisis got the care they actually needed.

Supporters, On The Opposition For years, 911 had only one play: send law enforcement to every mental health crisis — even when it was clearly a mental health issue, not a crime. That approach left officers stretched thin, distracted law enforcement from the most serious threats, and left people in crisis without the help they needed.

Skeptics, Channeling Supporters Mobile crisis response is the most pro–law enforcement public safety program we've got. Officers shouldn't be tied up with welfare checks when there are shootings to solve.

Skeptics, On Their Position "We know what works. More police officers on the streets keep us safe. Officers are trained to handle a wide range of crisis scenarios. Give them the resources, and trust them to do the job."

The Political Landscape

What's notable is how far the consensus has shifted. The strongest skeptical argument — "officers shouldn't be tied up with welfare checks when there are shootings to solve" — is itself an argument for mobile crisis response. When police chiefs, sheriffs, police union presidents, Republican governors, and 72% of Republican voters all describe these programs as effective, the political debate is less about whether to implement mobile crisis response and more about how fast to scale it.

The U.S. Department of Justice provided perhaps the most striking institutional validation. In its investigation of the Minneapolis Police Department — the same department at the center of the George Floyd case — the DOJ praised the city's Behavioral Crisis Response program for providing "timely, compassionate, and impactful services." The federal agency that documented systematic police failures in Minneapolis simultaneously endorsed the civilian alternative that city built in response. For leaders looking for political cover, it's hard to find a stronger signal.20a

"You wouldn't call your plumber to fix your teeth. You want the expertise to match with what the issue is."

Sarah Henrickson, co-founder, CARES mobile crisis team, Madison, Wisconsin19

What Different Stakeholders Want To Know

Different people in the conversation around mobile crisis response are asking different questions — not because they disagree on the goal, but because they carry different responsibilities and face different risks. Understanding what each group actually needs to hear isn't about tailoring a pitch. It's about taking their concerns seriously enough to answer them.

What Police Leadership Wants To Know

A police chief or sheriff considering mobile crisis response is asking operational questions: Will this make my officers safer? Will it free them for the work they're trained to do? Will the crisis team actually show up and handle calls competently, or will my officers end up cleaning up after them? And will this program make my department look like it failed?

The evidence that speaks to these concerns: Durham's 10,000+ officer hours returned to patrol7. Oklahoma City's 57% reduction in mental health dispatches8. Albuquerque's 120,000+ diverted calls9. The safety record — zero or near-zero responder injuries across every documented program. The fallback protocol — police are always available as backup, and the bright line (weapons, violence, active crime) always routes to officers. Chiefs who have championed these programs describe them as making their departments stronger, not weaker. Sacramento Sheriff Cooper: "Being mentally ill is not a crime and we can't be the answer."

What The Police Union Wants To Know

A union leader is evaluating this through a different lens than a chief. The questions are institutional: Does this threaten headcount? Does it shift budget away from the department? Does it create civilian classifications that erode police jurisdiction? And, critically — was the union consulted, or is this being imposed?

Cities where unions became partners share a pattern: explicit language protecting officer staffing, joint design of fallback protocols, and genuine inclusion before the public announcement. Austin's Police Association President Bullock testified in support: "It's time that we work towards getting law enforcement out of mental health. We have never claimed to be the experts." That endorsement didn't come from being told about the program — it came from being asked to help shape it.

What Fiscal Conservatives and Business Leaders Want To Know

The question here is straightforward: Does it pencil out? Is this a responsible use of public money, or another program that sounds good but adds cost without accountability?

The evidence that speaks to this: The Durham NBER10 evaluation found the average response costs $1,191 but generates $2,093 in fiscal savings — a net gain of $902 per call. The researchers concluded the program "pays for itself through fiscal externalities." SAMHSA data shows 23% lower costs per case. Twenty-one states now receive enhanced Medicaid reimbursement for these services. And 72% of Republican voters say mobile crisis response is effective — this isn't a policy that splits along partisan lines in practice, even when it does in cable news framing.

What The Budget Committee Wants To Know

Budget directors and finance committee members aren't asking whether the program works. They're asking: What does it cost to start? What does it cost to run? Where does the money come from? What happens when the grant expires? What's the Medicaid pathway in our state? What are the HR classifications?

These are governance questions, not opposition questions. Programs that answer them clearly — with startup costs separated from operating costs, a layered funding model (Medicaid + state grants + general fund), a sustainability plan beyond year one, and clean HR infrastructure — get funded. Programs that arrive at the budget hearing with a vision but not a fiscal note get deferred. The Durham data is particularly useful here: 95% of residents expressed willingness to pay for the program, valuing it at $102.91 per year — more than eight times its per-resident cost.

Program budgets provide concrete reference points: Madison operates on $1.7 million, Minneapolis on $5.9 million, Denver on $7.2 million, Philadelphia on $9 million, Los Angeles on $9.4 million — scaling with city size and coverage hours.

What Communities With Negative Police Experiences Want To Know

In neighborhoods where police encounters have gone badly — where families have lost trust in 911, where calling for help has sometimes made things worse — the question isn't about budgets or officer hours. It's about safety and dignity. Will this actually be different? Will the person who shows up treat my family member like a human being? Will they come without a weapon? Will they follow up, or just leave?

The evidence that speaks to this concern comes from the people who've experienced the alternative. In Portland, clients of Portland Street Response described feeling "treated with compassion and dignity," saying responders "treated us like humans." The share of unhoused residents who felt "unsafe calling 911" dropped from 57.9% to 44.9% after two years of the program. One person's summary: "I don't worry anymore. I can say I need Portland Street Response." In Durham, a resident told crisis responders: "I was really hoping it was going to be you who showed up." Mobile crisis teams arrive without sirens, without weapons, without the authority to arrest. They provide care and they follow up. That difference matters most to the people who've experienced what the old system felt like.

In Minneapolis, the BCR program is operated by Canopy Roots, a majority Black-owned mental health organization — a deliberate choice to ground the crisis response in community expertise in a city where the relationship between police and Black communities is the central public safety question.

What Journalists and Editorial Boards Want To Know

A reporter or editorial board evaluating mobile crisis response is asking: Is the evidence real or is this hype? What are the limits? What could go wrong? Are you being honest about the risks, or are you selling?

The evidence base now includes four independent peer-reviewed or working-paper findings: Stanford (Denver, 34% petty crime reduction), NBER (Durham, 50% crime report decline, program pays for itself), Michigan (45.2% arrest reduction), and BMC Health Services Research (mobile crisis as the only model with significant arrest reduction across multiple studies).20 The safety record spans tens of thousands of calls with zero or near-zero serious injuries. Arizona has operated a statewide Medicaid-funded crisis system for decades, demonstrating long-term structural viability. Honest limits remain: longitudinal data is thin, the research base covers a handful of cities, and scaling to full demand is unproven.