Who Are the Key Stakeholders?

Every person in the room where a Community Safety Department is proposed, debated, funded, or evaluated experiences it through a different lens. The line officer wants calls off his plate. The union strategist wants headcount protected. The dispatcher worries about liability. The family calling 911 is afraid of what happens when police arrive. The budget director needs HR classifications. The council member needs quarterly metrics. A CSD that satisfies one of these constituencies at the expense of the others does not hold.

How Police Experience It

The police perspective is not one conversation. It is four, often happening simultaneously within the same department.

The line officer is tired. Durham officers initially “chafed over the political fights that accompanied the program’s creation,” but the experience of having behavioral health calls taken off their workload changed the dynamic.¹ Durham Police Chief Patrice Andrews (retiring May 2026) described the shift: “I’ve heard officers on the radio asking for the department’s teams. So there is that change.”¹ Minneapolis Deputy Chief Erick Fors reported that “Feedback from the rank and file has been very positive.”² Portland Police Bureau spokesperson confirmed: “We hear on the radio all the time officers asking for the department.”³ Albuquerque Commander Jeff Barnard wants “additional funding and resources” for the CSD.⁴ The line officer’s trust is earned through field availability, reliable response times, and clear handoff protocols. It is lost if the crisis team does not show up, if handoffs are confusing, or if the program feels like a political project rather than operational support.

The police chief operates at the institutional level. Sacramento County Sheriff Jim Cooper framed the underlying logic: “Being mentally ill is not a crime and we can’t be the answer. Law enforcement officers are not trained mental health professionals.”⁵ Albuquerque then-Police Chief Harold Medina called ACS a department that “is already helping to free up our officers.”⁴ Helena, Montana Police Chief Brett Petty: “Expanding mobile crisis response services means increased safety for individuals, for law enforcement officers, and for our community at large.”⁶ Then-Seattle Police Chief Adrian Diaz: “This could be a model for the country.”⁷ A University of Michigan survey found 84% of county sheriffs and 82% of police chiefs support specialized emergency response teams for some 911 calls.⁸ Chiefs who support CSDs tend to frame them as force-multipliers, not replacements.

The union strategist evaluates the CSD through a different set of questions: Was the union consulted? Does it shift budget away from the department? Does it create civilian classifications that erode police jurisdiction? Cities where unions became partners share a pattern: explicit language protecting officer staffing, joint design of fallback protocols, and genuine inclusion before the public announcement. Austin Police Association President Michael Bullock testified before city council: “It’s time that we work towards getting law enforcement out of mental health. We have never claimed to be the experts, but yet we have been charged with the responsibility of responding to mental health crisis.”⁹ That endorsement came from being included in the process, not told about the outcome. A union president who feels excluded will frame the same program as a threat: “This program was created without consulting the people who know these streets,” or “This is a backdoor to defunding.” The substance of the program may be identical in both scenarios. The difference is whether the union was at the table and whether their concerns were taken into account.

The vocal opponent is a smaller but consistent archetype: a former officer or political figure with media access who frames any civilian response as soft on crime. The goal for a CSD champion is not to convert this voice but to ensure that moderate voices in the department and the union are louder. That requires the chief’s visible support, line officers’ voluntary testimonials, and a track record of safe, professional responses. When someone says “they’ll end up getting hurt and we’ll be blamed,” the chief and patrol officers need to already be on record saying otherwise.

How Dispatchers Experience It

Dispatchers are the gatekeepers of the entire system. If they do not route calls to the CSD, the department exists on paper but not in practice. The dispatch perspective is more complex than most leaders anticipate.

NYU researchers studying Denver’s crisis program found two patterns among dispatchers.¹⁰ The first is a liability concern: “For me, in the chair, if the crisis team can’t protect themselves, I’m not sending them by themselves. It’s a liability that falls on us as the dispatcher.” The second is muscle memory: dispatchers who have spent their entire careers sending police to crisis calls do not automatically think of a fourth option. Denver’s crisis program documented that dispatchers “forget” the alternative response option and worry about liability. The program answers only about 50% of eligible calls, with dispatch hesitancy identified as a primary cause.¹¹

Durham addressed this with structural design rather than relying on training alone.¹² The dual-mechanism dispatch model (automated CAD flagging plus embedded clinicians in the 911 center) produces the highest documented call capture rate. The automated system flags eligible calls without requiring the dispatcher to remember a new protocol. The embedded clinician can call back, gather additional information, check records, and make a clinical routing decision. This approach treats dispatch hesitancy as an engineering problem, not a training problem.

The dispatcher’s core concern is personal liability. If a dispatcher sends an unarmed team to a call that escalates, the dispatcher faces potential consequences. Cities that have secured consistent dispatcher cooperation have addressed this directly through indemnity language in standard operating procedures, joint sign-off between dispatch supervisors and clinical directors, and clear protocols for when to override the alternative response routing and send police.

How Families Experience It

For families dealing with a loved one in mental health crisis, calling 911 is often the last resort, not the first. The DOJ’s investigation of the Phoenix Police Department found officers who “fire Tasers at people with little or no warning” during behavioral health encounters and “fail to recognize that a person’s disability may impact whether they can understand commands.”¹³

Polling shows 84% of voters agree CSDs “meet unmet needs because some people who need help are too scared to call 911 because they’re scared of the police”.¹⁴ The Portland State University evaluation found that neighborhoods served by Portland’s crisis response department reported increased trust in emergency services.¹⁵ A Durham resident told department responders: “I was really hoping it was going to be you who showed up.”¹

The family perspective centers on a single question: will calling for help make the situation better or worse? A CSD provides a different answer to that question than armed response. For families with members who cycle through crisis repeatedly, the follow-up and case management components (Durham’s case management division,¹² Harris County’s post-transition linkage system¹⁶) are often more consequential than the initial emergency response.

How the Budget Office Experiences It

Budget directors and finance committee members are not asking whether the program works. They are asking: What does it cost to start? What does it cost to run? Where does the money come from? What happens when the grant expires? What is the Medicaid pathway in our state? What are the HR classifications?

These are governance questions, not opposition questions. Programs that answer them clearly, with startup costs separated from operating costs, a layered funding model, a sustainability plan beyond year one, and clean HR infrastructure, get funded. Programs that arrive at the budget hearing with a vision but not a fiscal note get deferred.

The Durham fiscal evaluation provides the budget office with concrete numbers: the average response costs $1,191 but generates $2,093 in fiscal savings, a net gain of $902 per call.¹⁷ When Durham residents were surveyed, 95% expressed willingness to pay for the program, valuing it at $102.91 per year, more than eight times the program’s per-resident cost.

The budget office also needs to understand the workforce classification challenge. Creating a new city department means building HR classifications that do not currently exist: crisis responder, community safety specialist, peer support field worker. Portland addressed this through a City Council resolution directing exploration of first-responder designation with full employment benefits (retirement, healthcare, pay parity).¹⁸ Albuquerque built a formal training academy that produces credentialed cohorts.¹⁹ These are infrastructure investments that the budget office needs to see priced and planned, not assumed.

How Council Members Experience It

Four archetypes appear on virtually every city council considering a CSD. The program’s durability depends on satisfying all four simultaneously.

The swing vote. The member in a mixed district who cares about crime optics and political survival. She wants quarterly metrics, district-specific data, and the ability to say “I voted for a pilot with accountability built in” rather than “I voted for a new program.” She supports if the risk looks manageable. She walks if the narrative gets ahead of the results.

The public safety traditionalist. Aligned with police, backed by public safety political action committees, and skeptical of anything that sounds like replacing officers. His trust drivers are clear: a fallback protocol that keeps police in charge when things escalate, joint testimony from the police department and health department, and explicit language that officer staffing is untouched. What kills his support: any language suggesting police have failed, any framing without a law enforcement voice, any celebration of the program that excludes officers.

The progressive reformer. Supports the program on principle but will walk if it is a half-measure: if the community is not in decision roles, if hiring does not reflect the neighborhoods served, if the program collaborates with police in ways that feel like co-optation. Her trust drivers are representative hiring, lived-experience representation on the team, an advisory board with real authority, and transparency when things go wrong.

The institutionalist. Does not care about the politics. She cares about whether the backend works: HR classifications, dispatch integration, vendor readiness, interagency memoranda of understanding. She will support a clean rollout and kill a messy one through committee. Her trust driver is a backbone memo covering HR, budget, dispatch, and legal before the first press conference.

Building a durable council majority means satisfying all four. A program with police involvement in the design (satisfying the traditionalist), representative hiring and lived-experience staffing (satisfying the reformer), clean HR and budget infrastructure (satisfying the institutionalist), and quarterly metrics by district (satisfying the swing vote) gives every archetype something to support. The demands are different. They are not contradictory.

Named Critics

CSD proposals draw criticism from multiple directions, and from named voices with specific arguments. The pattern itself is informative.

From law enforcement unions. Tim Davis, president of the Sacramento Police Officers Association, has argued that “our 911 dispatchers do an amazing job and are the perfect people to handle those in crisis” and that “it is imperative that 911 remain under the direction of the police department.”²⁰ Opposition from police unions tends to focus on maintaining dispatch authority and ensuring alternative programs do not reduce police staffing or budgets. Brian Marvel, president of the Peace Officers Research Association of California (representing 87,000 officers), has taken a different position, saying police “should not be the primary responders to calls related to homelessness or mental health” and that the issue “seems to have fallen on deaf ears. But it appears now that they’re taking it seriously.”²⁰

From elected officials on the right. In Portland, then-City Commissioner Rene Gonzalez ran on a law-and-order platform in 2022, defeated Commissioner Jo Ann Hardesty, who had created Portland’s crisis response department, froze hiring for the program in 2023, and described care-centered responses to homelessness as “enabling.”²¹ Gonzalez’s critique centered on program effectiveness and cost relative to outcomes.

From advocates on the left. Georgetown Law Professor Christy Lopez, who directs the Innovative Policing Program, has offered a measured caution: police crisis teams “have proved useful and important, but only to a point.”²² She notes that even well-designed crisis programs are “no replacement for an adequate mental health care system in a community.” In New York City, the Correct Crisis Intervention Today coalition has argued that the city’s crisis program was too limited from the start, noting the city “proposed adding only five mobile crisis teams” for a population of nine million.²²

From institutional researchers. The Congressional Research Service’s 2023 review found that “it remains less clear whether these changes translate into actual improved outcomes for people with mental health needs, such as fewer arrests and reduced use of force against them.”²³ This is a fair characterization of the evidence as it stood in 2023, though the field has since added the Durham fiscal evaluation¹⁷ and the Wayne State comparative study.²⁴

The pattern of criticism from both directions is documented. Programs face opposition from law enforcement unions for going too far and from progressive advocates for not going far enough.²⁰ ²¹ ²² Polling shows 83% of Democrats and 73% of Republicans view CSDs as effective.¹

Early Warning Signs

Stakeholder research identifies early indicators that a coalition supporting a CSD is beginning to erode:

From police: union newsletter tone shifts from “monitoring” to “opposed.” Council members begin repeating union talking points. Officers who previously requested CSD teams stop doing so.

From dispatch: dispatchers reroute eligible calls back to police. Questions in training sessions focus on lawsuits rather than protocols. Use of the alternative response dispatch code declines.

From council: shifts in public remarks from supportive to cautious. Quiet withdrawal from co-sponsorship. Requests for sunset clauses or independent audits that were not originally part of the design.

From the community: absence from public praise events. Social media posts about “transparency” or “real reform.” Advocacy organizations that were early supporters begin criticizing the program at public meetings.

These signals do not necessarily mean the program is failing. They mean the stakeholder relationship needs attention before a manageable problem becomes a political crisis.

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The Bottom Line

Every stakeholder evaluates a Community Safety Department through a different lens. Police leadership in established CSD cities consistently supports the model.¹ ⁴ ⁷ Union dynamics are determined by process (inclusion vs. exclusion) more than substance.⁹ Dispatchers need structural solutions, not just training.¹⁰ ¹² Families need confidence that calling for help will make the situation better.¹⁴ The budget office needs a fiscal note, not a vision statement.¹⁷ Council members come in four archetypes that must be satisfied simultaneously. Named critics exist from both political directions.²⁰ ²¹ ²²

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Source Appendix

1. Tradeoffs / The Marshall Project, “How Durham Got Police Onboard with Unarmed Crisis Response,” May 2, 2025. Andrews quotes, officer skepticism and adoption, Sgt. Leeder conversion. https://tradeoffs.org/2025/05/02/how-durham-north-carolina-got-police-onboard-with-unarmed-crisis-response/

2. Minneapolis Deputy Chief Erick Fors, testimony at Minneapolis Public Safety Committee meeting, April 20, 2022. Reported in Southwest Connector, Jan Willms, June 21, 2022. https://swconnector.com/stories/alternative-to-police,6234

3. KGW8, Portland Street Response reporting. https://www.kgw.com/article/news/local/the-story/portland-street-response-247-city-council-resolution-public-safety/283-28f2ee44-4ccc-4e3e-a804-d1af4f669bb6

4. CSG Justice Center, “Albuquerque, NM — Expanding First Response Program Highlights,” April 2025. Medina and Barnard. https://csgjusticecenter.org/publications/expanding-first-response/program-highlights/albuquerque-nm/

5. Sacramento County Sheriff Jim Cooper, press conference, February 4, 2025. CBS Sacramento. https://www.cbsnews.com/sacramento/news/sacramento-sheriff-explains-new-policy-to-turn-away-certain-calls-for-help/

6. Helena Police Chief Brett Petty, press release, April 2024. St. Peter’s Health: https://www.sphealth.org/stories-news/news/law-enforcement-and-behavioral-health-professionals-expand-mobile-crisis-response. Montana Free Press, April 22, 2024: https://montanafreepress.org/2024/04/22/crisis-response-team-scores-funding-plans-to-expand/

7. Office of Mayor Bruce Harrell, CARE launch, September 21, 2023. Diaz quote. https://harrell.seattle.gov/2023/09/21/mayor-harrell-announces-investments-supporting-upcoming-launch-of-care-seattles-new-public-safety-department/

8. Debra Horner, “Michigan Local Leaders’ Views on Policing Co-Response and Alternative Response Teams,” CLOSUP, University of Michigan, February 2025. 84% of sheriffs and 82% of chiefs support co-response or alternative response. https://closup.umich.edu/sites/closup/files/2025-02/MPPS-Spring-2024-Alternative-Response.pdf

9. Austin Police Association President Michael Bullock, testimony before Austin City Council, January 30, 2025. Community Impact, Ben Thompson, February 11, 2025. https://communityimpact.com/austin/south-central-austin/government/2025/02/11/austins-responses-to-mental-health-calls-under-review-with-aim-to-reduce-police-involvement/

10. Policing Project at NYU School of Law, “Transforming Denver’s First Response Model,” 2023. Dispatcher liability concerns and hesitancy. https://www.policingproject.org/transforming-denvers-first-response-model-report

11. Urban Institute, Denver STAR interim evaluation, 2024. ~38-50% eligible call response rate. https://www.urban.org/research/publication/evaluating-alternative-crisis-response-denvers-support-team-assisted-response

12. CSG Justice Center, “Durham, NC — Expanding First Response Program Highlights,” updated December 2024. Dual-mechanism dispatch, CAD flagging, embedded clinicians, care navigation. https://csgjusticecenter.org/publications/expanding-first-response/program-highlights/durham-nc/

13. U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Phoenix Police Department Findings Report, June 2024. https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-06/Phoenix%20Findings%20Report%20Final%20-%20Final%20508.pdf

14. Safer Cities, national survey of 2,400 registered voters. 84% agree on unmet needs from fear of police.

15. Portland State University HRAC, PSR Year Two Evaluation, July 2023. https://www.pdx.edu/homelessness/sites/homelessness.web.wdt.pdx.edu/files/2023-07/HRAC%20Portland%20Street%20Response%20Year%20Two%20Evaluation%20Report_FINAL%20FOR%20WEBSITE.pdf

16. Harris County HART transition context. FOX 26 Houston, May 2024. https://www.fox26houston.com/news/harris-county-mental-health-program-faces-uncertain-future-amid-financial-concerns

17. Bocar A. Ba et al., NBER Working Paper No. 34344, October 2025. $902 net savings per call. https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w34344/w34344.pdf

18. Portland City Council Resolution No. 37709, June 25, 2025. First-responder designation. https://www.portland.gov/council/documents/resolution/adopted/37709

19. CNM, ACS Academy partnership, October 2025. https://www.cnm.edu/news/cnm-and-city-of-albuquerque-launch-annual-acs-academy-to-train-alternative-first-responders

20. Tim Davis (Sacramento Police Officers Association): MindSite News, July 18, 2023. https://mindsitenews.org/2023/07/18/advocates-call-for-911-changes-police-have-mixed-feelings/. Brian Marvel (PORAC president): CalMatters, July 2020. https://calmatters.org/justice/2020/07/police-mental-crisis-response-california/

21. Rene Gonzalez context from KGW8 Portland reporting and Portland.gov PSR 5-year retrospective: https://www.portland.gov/streetresponse/news/2026/2/17/five-years-portland-street-response-has-become-pillar-public-safety. “Gonzalez unseated Hardesty,” hiring freeze, program relocated from Fire Bureau. Hardesty’s creation of PSR: Willamette Week, November 15, 2019: https://www.wweek.com/news/2019/11/15/commissioner-jo-ann-hardesty-announces-details-of-portland-street-response-team-pilot-program/. OPB, October 20, 2022: Hardesty “turned the program from an idea to the city’s most promising police alternative.” https://www.opb.org/article/2022/10/20/portland-city-council-election-2022-oregon-elections-candidates-jo-ann-hardesty/

22. Christy Lopez, Georgetown Law Professor from Practice, co-director of Center for Innovations in Community Safety. Lopez has written that crisis response alternatives are “useful and important, but only to a point” and are “no replacement for an adequate mental health care system.” See also Inquest, “Ferguson at Ten,” August 2024: https://inquest.org/a-pattern-of-injustice/. CCIT-NYC press release, November 11, 2020: program “does not go far enough.” https://www.communityaccess.org/storage/images/Press_Releases/Press_Release_11-11-20_CCIT-NYC_Critiques_NYC_Announcement_of_Pilot_to_Respond_to_911_Mental_Health_Crisis_Calls.pdf. THE CITY, July 18, 2022: Hedigan criticism of NYC B-HEARD. https://www.thecity.nyc/2022/07/18/mental-health-911-b-heard-teams/

23. Lisa N. Sacco and Isobel Sorenson, “Issues in Law Enforcement Reform: Responding to Mental Health Crises,” Congressional Research Service, Report R47285. https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R47285

24. Leonard Swanson et al., Wayne State Michigan study, Psychiatric Research and Clinical Practice, May 2025. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC12418740/