Do People Support This?

Community Safety Departments poll with bipartisan margins that hold after voters hear opposition arguments. What makes the numbers actionable is that law enforcement leadership has landed in the same place as voters.

All polling data in this card measures public sentiment, not program effectiveness. Polling tells you whether a policy is politically viable. It does not tell you whether a program works. The outcome evidence is in Q05.

The National Numbers

A Safer Cities national survey of 2,400 registered voters found 76% say CSDs are “effective” at making communities safer, against 17% who say they are not, a 59-point margin. A separate survey found 82% support creating a CSD in their community.¹

The bipartisan split: 83% of Democrats and 73% of Republicans view CSDs as effective.¹ That ten-point gap is narrower than partisan gaps on most policing reform proposals.

When asked to choose between spending new public safety dollars on a CSD or hiring more police officers, 56% preferred the CSD and 37% preferred more police, a 19-point margin.¹ That preference held after respondents heard both supportive and opposition arguments.

The core argument tested at 82% agreement: “Community safety departments are about sending the right responder to address every problem. When the call is for a robbery in progress, we should send the police. When the call is for a mental health crisis, we should send trained mental health professionals.”¹

Support for Specific Functions

Voters were asked about individual CSD functions. Every one tested above 80%:¹

Mental health crisis units combined with homeless outreach: 89%.¹ Overdose follow-up within 72 hours: 85%.¹ Needle cleanup teams: 84%.¹ Visible uniformed presence for crime deterrence: 83%.¹

These numbers reveal something about which functions drive the overall support. Mental health crisis response and homeless outreach are the foundation. But needle cleanup and visible presence, functions that address quality-of-life concerns rather than acute crisis, also command strong majorities. The CSD model’s breadth, covering both clinical emergencies and neighborhood livability, appears to be a political asset rather than a liability.

Voters also expressed clear preferences on governance.¹ 68% said CSDs should be staffed by city employees, not private contractors.¹ 80% agreed there is “more accountability and transparency when the city hires and manages community safety departments staff directly.”¹ 62% preferred the unified department model over operating the same programs as separate initiatives across different agencies.¹

The Exposure Effect

In Harris County, Texas, 78% of residents initially said the county’s mobile crisis program was effective at making the county safer. After learning more about how the program operates, support jumped to 88%, a ten-point increase. Among Republicans specifically, support rose from 83% to an even higher figure after exposure.¹

This exposure effect has been documented in multiple jurisdictions. In Virginia, voters became more supportive of Governor Glenn Youngkin’s crisis response plan specifically when they learned it included mobile crisis teams, and support climbed further when told the plan was “designed to relieve the law enforcement community’s burden of responding to behavioral health care crises.”¹ After voters watched a news segment about Albuquerque’s CSD, support for creating a department jumped 12 to 13 percentage points, reaching 88%.¹

The exposure effect means familiarity is an asset, not a liability. For a local leader, this changes the political calculus: launching a CSD does not carry the risk that constituents will turn against it as they learn more. The documented pattern is the opposite. The more people learn, the more they support it. Durham’s Director Ryan Smith reports such strong community embrace that residents display yard signs and post public messages of support.² That kind of organic constituent visibility is difficult to manufacture and valuable for sustaining political will through budget cycles.

What Messages Move People

Randomized controlled testing and max-diff studies (where respondents are forced to rank and make tradeoffs) have identified which messages perform best for the broader alternative response category, which CSDs are part of.¹

The top-performing message across every demographic and ideological subgroup tested: “Police can’t do it alone.” In the RCT, this message increased support for a hypothetical ballot measure by four percentage points relative to a control group. It was also the top performer in the max-diff study.

The second and third best-performing messages: “Fully fund public safety” and “Treatment, not trauma.” Both increased support in both study designs.

The substantive argument that tested highest, at 86% agreement: medical professionals know how to recognize signs of acute mental illness, de-escalate situations, and connect people to care in ways that police officers, regardless of compassion and skill, are not trained for.¹ That argument reached 88% of Democrats and 79% of Republicans.

The police-focus argument, at 82% agreement: letting medical professionals handle mental health calls allows police officers to focus on serious crimes like robbery, assault, and murder.¹ That reached 87% of Democrats and 79% of Republicans.

The escalation argument, which many officials are reluctant to make, still tested at 78% overall, including 75% of Republicans: police officers arriving with sirens, lights, and firearms can make mental health crises worse rather than better.¹

Two framing approaches consistently underperformed: sloganeering (“defund,” “abolish,” or any language that positions the policy as anti-police) and language that centers racial justice rather than public safety outcomes. The frames that tested highest center safety, expertise, and efficiency.¹

Law Enforcement Support

Public support alone does not settle the political question. A policy can poll at 80% and still fail if the police chief opposes it at the council hearing. What makes the CSD polling data actionable is that law enforcement leadership in cities with established programs has landed in the same place as voters.

A University of Michigan survey of law enforcement leaders across the state found that 84% of county sheriffs and 82% of police chiefs support having specialized emergency response teams that include mental health and social work professionals for some 911 calls.³ That number mirrors the 80% public support almost exactly.

The voices from CSD cities are not hedged. Albuquerque Police Commander Luke Languit: “On behalf of the Albuquerque Police Department, your work is so much appreciated and it does not go unnoticed.”⁴ He credited the CSD with enabling crime reduction by freeing officers to focus on felony crimes. Albuquerque then-Police Chief Harold Medina called it a department that “is already helping to free up our officers.”⁵ Durham Police Chief Patrice Andrews (retiring May 2026) acknowledged initial officer skepticism but reported the shift: “I’ve heard officers on the radio asking for the department’s teams. So there is that change.”⁶ Portland Police Bureau spokesperson: “We hear on the radio all the time officers asking for the department.”⁷ Then-Seattle Police Chief Adrian Diaz: “This could be a model for the country.”⁸ Minneapolis Deputy Chief Erick Fors: “Feedback from the rank and file has been very positive.”⁹

Sacramento County Sheriff Jim Cooper framed the underlying logic: “Being mentally ill is not a crime and we can’t be the answer. Law enforcement officers are not trained mental health professionals.”¹⁰ Austin Police Association President Michael Bullock, testifying before city council, said: “It’s time that we work towards getting law enforcement out of mental health. We have never claimed to be the experts, but yet we have been charged with the responsibility of responding to mental health crisis.”¹¹

When a police union president says that on the record, the “anti-police” attack line loses its basis. The potential vulnerability for a CSD — an opponent framing it as “defunding” or “replacing” police — is undercut when officers themselves say they want these calls handled by someone else.

The “Defund” Question

The predictable opposition argument against CSDs is that they are “defund the police with a new name.” The polling data addresses this directly.¹

89% of voters agree that CSDs “allow police departments to focus on solving serious crimes.”¹ 84% agree CSDs “meet unmet needs because some people who need help are too scared to call 911 because they’re scared of the police.”¹ 81% agree CSDs “reduce the likelihood that a mental health crisis will result in injury or death.”¹

Albuquerque’s police budget is more than twenty times larger than its CSD budget (The New Yorker).¹² The CSD model is explicitly additive, not subtractive. It does not reduce police funding. It adds a new capability that police departments do not have and, by the testimony of police leadership in every established CSD city, do not want to provide.

In cities where police leadership publicly credits the CSD with enabling crime reduction, the “anti-police” frame has not taken hold.

What the Polling Does Not Tell You

Polling measures sentiment at a point in time. It does not predict how voters will respond to a specific incident, a determined opposition campaign, or a budget fight where CSD funding competes directly with police overtime or fire department equipment.

The polling is national and from a handful of local jurisdictions (Harris County, Virginia, Chicago). Whether these numbers hold in rural counties, small towns, or jurisdictions where police unions hold unusual political power is untested. The cities that have actually built CSDs are concentrated in mid-to-large progressive urban areas. A 73% Republican approval rate measured nationally may not reflect the dynamics in a specific county where the sheriff’s association is the dominant political force.

Support for the concept does not equal support for the budget line. 82% may support creating a CSD in the abstract, but the vote that matters is the specific appropriation in a specific budget year, competing against specific alternatives. 82% support nationally, roughly five operational CSDs.

The polling also does not capture intensity. An 82% majority that mildly favors CSDs can be outweighed politically by a 10% minority that intensely opposes them, particularly if that minority includes organized groups (police unions, political action committees) that show up at council hearings and fund opposition candidates.

One vulnerability the polling has not yet tested: what happens to support after a serious incident involving a CSD responder. The safety record across more than 120,000 calls in Albuquerque¹³ and hundreds of thousands more across other programs is consistent (zero or near-zero serious injuries). But no political program survives indefinitely without a crisis communications plan. A single high-profile incident, even one that reflects bad luck rather than bad design, could shift the political dynamic in ways that 82% aggregate support would not predict. The polling tells you the policy is popular. It does not tell you the policy is durable under adversarial conditions that have not yet materialized.

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The Bottom Line

Community Safety Departments command 76-82% public support nationally with bipartisan margins (83% Democrat, 73% Republican).¹ Support increases when voters learn more about actual programs. Law enforcement leadership in every established CSD city publicly supports the model.⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ⁷ ⁸ ⁹ The messages that tested highest center expertise, safety, and letting police focus on serious crime.¹ The “defund” attack has not gained traction where police leadership vocally supports the department. The gap between 82% support and five operational CSDs indicates that political viability and political execution are different challenges. All figures in this card are polling data and measure sentiment, not program effectiveness.

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Source Appendix

1. Safer Cities, national surveys of 2,400-2,503 registered voters including randomized controlled testing and max-diff studies. Figures include: 76% effective, 82% support, 83%/73% partisan split, 56%/37% spending preference, 89%/85%/84%/83% function-specific support, 68% city employees, 80% accountability, 62% unified model, Harris County exposure effect (78%→88%), Virginia exposure effect, Albuquerque video exposure effect (+12-13 points to 88%), message testing results (“Police can’t do it alone,” “Fully fund public safety,” “Treatment, not trauma”), 86% medical professionals argument, 82% police-focus argument, 78% escalation argument, 89%/84%/81% “defund” rebuttal figures.

2. Jeff Billman, “A New Model for Public Safety in Durham,” The Assembly NC, June 26, 2024. Community embrace, yard signs context. https://www.theassemblync.com/politics/criminal-justice/durhams-new-model-for-public-safety/

3. Debra Horner, “Michigan Local Leaders’ Views on Policing Co-Response and Alternative Response Teams,” Center for Local, State, and Urban Policy (CLOSUP), Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan, February 2025. Spring 2024 Michigan Public Policy Survey wave; 54 county sheriffs, 234 police chiefs. 84% of sheriffs and 82% of chiefs support co-response or alternative response. https://closup.umich.edu/sites/closup/files/2025-02/MPPS-Spring-2024-Alternative-Response.pdf

4. Commander Luke Languit, remarks at ACS 100,000-call milestone press event, March 2025. https://www.cabq.gov/acs/news/albuquerque-community-safety-marks-100-000-calls-for-service-milestone

5. CSG Justice Center, “Albuquerque, NM — Expanding First Response Program Highlights,” April 2025. Medina quote. https://csgjusticecenter.org/publications/expanding-first-response/program-highlights/albuquerque-nm/

6. Tradeoffs / The Marshall Project, “How Durham Got Police Onboard with Unarmed Crisis Response,” May 2, 2025. Andrews quotes, officer adoption. https://tradeoffs.org/2025/05/02/how-durham-north-carolina-got-police-onboard-with-unarmed-crisis-response/

7. KGW8 Portland Street Response reporting. Officer radio requests. https://www.kgw.com/article/news/local/the-story/portland-street-response-247-city-council-resolution-public-safety/283-28f2ee44-4ccc-4e3e-a804-d1af4f669bb6

8. Office of Mayor Bruce Harrell, CARE Department launch announcement, September 21, 2023. Diaz quote. https://harrell.seattle.gov/2023/09/21/mayor-harrell-announces-investments-supporting-upcoming-launch-of-care-seattles-new-public-safety-department/

9. Minneapolis Deputy Chief Erick Fors, testimony at Minneapolis Public Safety Committee meeting, April 20, 2022. Reported in Southwest Connector, Jan Willms, June 21, 2022. https://swconnector.com/stories/alternative-to-police,6234

10. Sacramento County Sheriff Jim Cooper, press conference, February 4, 2025. Reported in CBS Sacramento and Folsom Times. https://www.cbsnews.com/sacramento/news/sacramento-sheriff-explains-new-policy-to-turn-away-certain-calls-for-help/

11. Austin Police Association President Michael Bullock, testimony before Austin City Council, January 30, 2025. Reported in Community Impact, Ben Thompson, February 11, 2025. https://communityimpact.com/austin/south-central-austin/government/2025/02/11/austins-responses-to-mental-health-calls-under-review-with-aim-to-reduce-police-involvement/

12. Murat Oztaskin, “Sending Help Instead of the Police in Albuquerque,” The New Yorker, February 4, 2023. Police budget “more than twenty times larger.” https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/sending-help-instead-of-the-police-in-albuquerque

13. City of Albuquerque, “Albuquerque Community Safety Department Marks Four Years of Impact and Innovation,” September 2025. 120,000+ calls, <1% police backup. https://www.cabq.gov/acs/news/albuquerque-community-safety-department-marks-four-years-of-impact-and-innovation